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Europe; recently, however, the debate has been taken
up in Germany, and this book by Professor Ursula Wolf
of Berlin is one of the first philosophical contributions
to it from that country.
As we might expect of a work by a German
philosopher, the discussion of theoretical issues
occupies the most important place in it, although it is
plain that the authoress is well acquainted also with
practical matters; the most original parts of the book
indeed are those devoted to general moral theory, and
it is to these that I shall largely confine myself. Much
of this discussion of the fundamental questions of ethics
is presented by way of a criticism of other writers, both
Gennan (Kant, Schopenhauer, Tugendhat) and English
(Singer, Clark, Rorty, and others), but in appraising
Professor Wolf's arguments I shall as far as possible
abstract these from their critical context.
The central argument of the book is contained in
the third of its five chapters (especially pp. 69-81) and
is, as I understand it, the following. There can be no
ultimate grounding of ethics, but the most reasonable
(sinnvoll) moral theory is a "liberal" ethics, distin
guished by the absence of metaphysical pretensions and
the equal status it accords all human beings. However,
because no empirical property can be found equally
distributed amongst men to justify its egalitarian
conclusions, liberal ethics has to presuppose the equal
possession by human beings of some non-empirical

Seen in the perspective of cultural history, the
contemporary movement to grant animals a moral status
equal to that of human beings represents the final and
catastrophic stage of a progressive crisis of confidence
within our Western civilisation. Having abandoned first
our belief in the proven superiority of our culture over
all others, then our belief in the natural superiority of
men over women, we are now urged to abandon also
our belief in the intrinsic superiority ofhumankind over
the beasts. The causes contributing to this last loss of
self-esteem are no doubt various and conflicting:
vegetarianism, the ecological movement, horror at the
medical and industrial exploitation of animals, the
influence of Indian religions, and a realisation of the
remoter consequences of the rationalistic conception
ofman; some might also see in it perhaps an intellectual
expression of the lapse into bestiality against which
Biblical writers often warned the impious. Hitherto the
philosophical debate concerning the moral status of
animals has been conducted almost entirely within the
English-speaking world, largely on account of its
traditional concern for animals and its affinity for
utilitarianism, which can more readily accommodate
animals than the Kantianism dominant in continental
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afiimals' relationship to their own welfare is less self
aware or conceptualised (rejlektierO than man's (76):
but self-awareness essentially makes a difference of
kind, not of degree, and it is difficult to see how in the
absence of conceptualisation animals can pursue their
own good consciously as their good. Second, the
equivalence between the capacity to suffer, thriving or
ailing (gut oder schlecht gehen), and willing or striving
towards one's own good has to be demonstrated and
not simply asserted (76,89,94-5). Professor Wolf insists
that sympathy is directed upon the sufferer, not upon
the state of suffering as such (49, 52), and that elemental
(elementar) or uninterpreted suffering must be given
greater weight than interpreted suffering (78); but she
overlooks the fact that the more elemental the suffering
the less the identity of the sufferer is relevant to the
response it evokes, and she herself questions whether
there is any pain or suffering which is perceived without
interpretation or as such, even by the sufferer (79).
Third, Professor Wolf simply leaves unexplained the
transition from the feeling of sympathy to the standpoint
of concern for others' suffering, which reintroduces into
ethics Kantian notions of consistency and universality:
when we act in accordance with some principle to
relieve suffering which occasions us no vicarious pain,
we act as rational beings in a way which sympathetic
feelings of themselves cannot make intelligible.
ProfessorWolfnever, to my mind, makes it perfectly
clear whether she attributes to animals exactly the same
moral status as that ofman or some other, partly because
she characterises the opposed position variously as
attributing a weaker, different, or unequal status to them,
partly because she draws no explicit distinction between
the possession of an equal status and the equal
possession of a status; the latter expression is strictly a
tautology, for a status is either possessed or not, there
are no degrees of possession, whereas different statuses
may be ranked by some principle. The claim that
animals enjoy some status or other within morality is
not implausible, although my own view is that they bear
at most a quasi-status by analogy with human beings;
the claim that animals share the very same moral status
as human beings is absurd, and would be inconsistent
with the concession that animals do not possess the same
rights as man (104-5), for a status is constituted precisely
by the rights and duties associated with it.
The nature of the transition from the standpoint of
generalised sympathy to the attribution of rights to
the objects of such sympathy is left obscure, because

property such as reason or intrinsic worth. By
eliminating this inconsistency and so "radicalising"
liberal ethics, we find that the only empirical property
shared equally by all human beings is the capacity to
suffer (Leidensftlhigkeit); but this property is shared by
most, if not all animals, who must therefore also enjoy
the status of objects of moral concern. This "ethics of
generalised sympathy" (or "pity," Mitleid> of itself
provides only the core of an ethical theory,· not any
concrete norm such as that no suffering may be inflicted
without good reason; but the adoption of this standpoint
implies the attribution to the objects of such sympathy
of certain rights, from which in tum follow certain
obligations towards them. Those parts of ethics which
are not essentially concerned with individuals lie outside
the scope of this theory, however.
Despite its simplicity, Professor Wolf's argument
requires clarification at a number of points. It remained
unclear to me whether she offers her ethics of
generalised sympathy as the only moral theory she
herself can accept, as the one she recommends to others,
as the one actually held implicitly by most people, as
the only one which withstands philosophical criticism,
or as the only one able to justify the condemnation of
the contemporary treatment of animals. This unclarity
is in part a consequence of an unclarity in the method
followed in establishing this moral theory: despite her
criticisms of other theories, Professor Wolf states that
none of them are simply false; they are rather one-sided
(57), since each implies a certain approach (Sichtweise);
but although she promises to explain how one can argue
about the plausibility of approaches (55), it is not evident
to me that she does so.
Professor Wolf, furthermore, does not distinguish
explicitly between the three senses in which sympathy
is generalised in her theory, namely (i) from human
beings to animals (or some of them) (49, 76), (ii) from
short-lived (punktuell) episodes of physical pain to the
entire weal br woe, in Schopenhauer's phrase, of all
sentient beings (88, 1(0), and (iii) from an emotion
(Ajfekt) or sympathetic feeling (MitgeftihD to a consistent
attitude (Einstel!ung) or stance (Grundhaltung) which
can alone provide the basis of a morality (51-2,85,97,
143); these three generalisations are however inde
pendent one of another, and each gives rise to peculiar
difficulties. First, although there are unquestionably
many similarities between man and the higher animals,
it is too much to speak here, as she suggests, of
continuities (36, 95); Professor Wolf herself admits that
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essentially feminine one; by that I intend no
disparagement, for the value of such feminine concern
is beyond question; but rather than constituting a
morality, or even the core of one, such concern rather
supplements or corrects morality, rather as equity
supplements common law in the English legal system,
or mercy tempers justice in Christian theology. And
indeed there are signs in her book that the authoress is
not entirely happy with her own argument: the
confidence she expresses in it varies markedly, and at
times disconcertingly (87), and the tone becomes
noticeably tentative at crucial points (74, 80, 120, 123);
she frequently breaks off the argument or postpones
further discussion of difficulties; and although she
roundly declares that she can make nothing of absolute
values (69) and even more radically that "nothing has a
value, not even man" (142), she seems fascinated
throughout her book by the very idea of some higher or
intrinsic worth in man, recurs repeatedly to Christian
morality, and gives a sympathetic account of Jewish
teaching on animals (133-5). She herself would not
seem entirely free, then, of the longing (Sehnsucht) for
a foundation of morality to which she alludes (62); and
at times (95, 110-1, 114-6, 144) her policy of raising
the moral status of animals appears to spring less from
concern for their sufferings than from a fear of the
consequences of granting man no higher status; but, as
the example of Hindu culture may warn us, the
consequences of such a policy could be worse for all,
animals included. To defend unwelcome conclusions
because they follow from some metaphysical or anti
metaphysical doctrine to which one is committed is in
the end not a proof of rationality or constancy of
purpose, but rather of inflexibility and desperation: it
would be more rational to regard the argument as a
reductio ad absurdum of the initial assumption and to
look elsewhere for one's starting-point. Altogether, I
felt, Professor Wolf's book had something about it of
the spiritlessness and uncertainty of direction
characteristic not only of a culture which has lost faith
in itself, but also of a philosophical school which has
largely abandoned its own tradition for the half-hearted
espousal of another.
Professor Wolf's pessimism concerning the
possibility of a rational grounding of ethics, and her
desire to propose an ethical theory free of metaphysical
assumptions, may arise in part from a misapprehension
concerning the nature of metaphysics. However
dogmatically metaphysical doctrines may be presented

the author says both that the two ate simply different
formulations of the same (81) and that the former
"generates" or "constitutes" the latter (81, 83); she
also dismisses difficulties with the idea of animal rights
on the grounds that animals cannot lay claim to them
as a mere dispute about words (40). The whole
conception of rights seems foreign to an ethics of
sympathy, however, for sympathy or pity is precisely
the response evoked by suffering where all formal
claims to consideration are absent; that is, I believe,
the case with animals, and consequently moral regard
for them springs rather from generosity, not from a
recognition of their rights.
Professor Wolf regards rights as conceptually prior
to obligations (81, 88), on these grounds criticising Kant
for the contrary view (40), and allows that there can
therefore be rights without corresponding obligations
(82, 90, 148). In fact, her own view makes it easier to
understand how there can be obligations without
corresponding rights, for once the notion of obligation
has been established via rights, it can then be extended
independently of the latter, as with animals-if, that is,
one can speak of an obligation to be generous at all.
In contrast to her central argument, much of
Professor Wolf's discussion elsewhere of particular
moral issues, such as vivisection (21-8) and the sanctity
of human life (129-33), is clear and, given her
assumptions, decisive, and these parts of her book may
well be found most useful by readers. Nevertheless there
are errors: one cannot say both that the attitude of
extended sympathy is compatible with the view that
man is incomparably more important than animals (53)
and that it has been shown to follow from the ethics of
sympathy that animals have the same moral status as
man (55); on the other hand, there is no incompatibility
between the positions of Midgley or Diamond and that
of Becker (54-5), because the second term of
comparison is not the same; the claim that Kantian
ethical positions cannot justify the condemnation of tax
evasion (84) overlooks the first formulation of the
categorical imperative; and the argument that inanimate
nature is entitled to less respect than animate because a
stone, say, can be broken up into smaller stones without
losing its petrosity (Steinsein, 139) succumbs to the
obvious counterexamples ofpulverisation and smelting.
It is not, I think, unfair to say that Professor Wolf's
conception of morality, with its stress upon concern for
individuals as a response to need rather than as a
response to worthiness for protection (76), is an
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is to be regretted. I noted three misprints (34 1 685,
133 8) and arepeated distortion of entire lines (1210' 279 ,
10611 .4' 118 1°'6)' The physical appearance of the book
is elegant but serious, lacking the meretricious trappings
of a cover illustration, with which most English
publishers of philosophy now hire purchasers.

by their advocates, they actually arise and gain their
plausibility from a reflexion upon experience and an
abstraction from it of its most significant features; a
perfect harmony between experience and its simplified,
philosophical representation is not therefore to be
expected, and the task offurther philosophical reasoning
is precisely to reconcile recalcitrant data with the
metaphysical principle. If one is seeking an empirical
basis for a metaphysical distinction between man and
other animals, one may well find it in the fact mentioned
by Professor Wolf in passing (118) that man is the
universal enemy of animals in the wild. This instinctive
fear can hardly be explained in evolutionary terms, for
most species have not known man long enough for
natural selection to operate; rather it would seem that
there is in animals an obscure awareness, perhaps akin
to awe, that in man they are confronted with a being
superior in kind to themselves whom they cannot
comprehend. This suggestion complements the ideas
of R. Leicht reported by Professor Wolf with apparent
approval (138) that in dealing with liminal forms of
human existence (such as embryos) we are made aware
of the indefeasible limits to our own self-understanding,
and ought therefore to show respect for something
necessarily lying beyond our ken; such ideas offer in
my view the most promising approach to these issues,
although Professor Wolf's own attempts to develop
them by means of an analogy with artistic understanding
(138-40) I consider frankly misguided.
The book leaves a certain amount to be desired in
purely technical respects. It is sometimes unclear
whether the writer is expounding others' ideas or her
own (72-3, 75, 77-8), a fault less readily excused in
German which has the subjunctive at its disposal for
reported speech; and she makes a practice of giving
indefinite references, especially forwards, many of
which I found difficult or impossible to identify
(34,37,48,55,72,75,105). Professor Wolf's German
is uncomplicated, but entirely devoid of elegance: the
absolute use of Erstens is unnecessarily clumsy
(49,60,69,87), bzw., beziehungsweise is not only ugly
but ambiguous between a real and a verbal alternative
(76, 89, 94), and lovers of the German language will
regret the introduction into it of such words as
interagieren and nwralischer Akteur. The convention
followed in the bibliography of abbreviating as St.
names beginning with these letters has no phonetic
justification in the case of English names and has a
comical effect to English eyes. The absence of an index
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